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Many studies …nd that an additional year of schooling increases individual wages by 6-10
percent. The economic consequences of a change in average schooling may di¤er from
this private return, however. Changes in average education levels raise wages by less than
the private returns to schooling if schooling has signaling value in addition to raising
productivity, or if some other factor of production is inelastically supplied. On the other
hand, the value of education to society may exceed the private return because of positive
social returns due to changes in relative wages, or human capital externalities from a
more educated labor force. Despite the potential importance of this question for economic
policy, much less is known about the social returns to education than the private returns.
In this paper, we develop a framework for estimating social returns by investigating the
e¤ect of state average schooling levels on individual wages, while controlling for the e¤ect
of individual schooling.
The principal challenge in any e¤ort to estimate the e¤ects of education on wages is
identi…cation. Individual education and average schooling levels are correlated with wages
for a variety of reasons, so the observed association between schooling variables and wages
is not necessarily causal. To solve this problem, we use instrumental variables to estimate
the e¤ect of both individual schooling and the average schooling level in an individual’s
state. The instruments for average schooling are derived from compulsory attendance laws
and child labor laws in states of birth. Together we refer to these as Compulsory Schooling
Laws (CSLs). The problem of estimating social returns is complicated by the fact that
there are two endogenous regressors a¤ected by CSLs, individual schooling and average
schooling. This problem is solved by using quarter of birth dummies as instruments for
individual schooling, as in Angrist and Krueger (1991), while using CSLs as instruments
for average schooling.
State CSLs generate an attractive “natural experiment” for the estimation of social
returns for a number of reasons. Although these laws were determined by social forces in
the states at the time of passage, the CSLs that a¤ected an individual in childhood are not
a¤ected by future wages. We also show that CSLs a¤ected schooling almost exclusively
in middle school and high school grades. This suggests that CSLs are not correlated with
omitted state-of-birth and cohort e¤ects, since these e¤ects would likely be related to
college-going behavior as well. Finally, changing CSLs were part of the 1910-1940 “high
school movement” that Goldin (1998) has argued was responsible for much of the humancapital accumulation in the US in the twentieth century.
The bulk of the empirical work in the paper uses samples of white men aged 40-49 from
the 1960-80 Censuses, although some estimates are computed using an extended sample
that includes 1950 and 1990 data. Blacks are excluded from the estimation because
cohorts of blacks in these data sets experienced marked changes in school quality (see,
e.g., Card and Krueger, 1992a; Margo, 1990; Welch, 1973). We focus on the 1960-80
Censuses because they include information on quarter of birth and because the census
schooling variable changes in 1990. The fact that men in their 40s are on a relatively
‡at part of the age-earnings pro…le also facilitates the use of quarter of birth dummies as
instruments.
OLS estimates using data from the 1960-80 Censuses show a large positive relationship
between average schooling and individual wages. A one-year increase in average schooling
is associated with about a 7 percent increase in average wages, over and above the roughly
equal private returns. In contrast with the OLS estimates, IV estimates of social returns in
1960-80 are typically less than one percent, and signi…cantly lower than the corresponding
OLS estimates. Adding data from the 1990 Census results in somewhat larger estimates
of social returns, but this …nding seems to be generated at least in part by problems with
the schooling variable in the 1990 Census.
In addition to having theoretical e¤ects on overall wage levels, exogenous changes
in average schooling may change the private returns to schooling. Changes in average
schooling caused by compulsory schooling laws provide an attractive source of variation
to estimate the e¤ect of supply shocks on the private returns to schooling. We explore
this issue by simultaneously estimating social returns and changes in private returns to
schooling. The results of this analysis also provide no evidence for signi…cant social
returns. They do suggest, however, that the returns to education may actually go up
when state average education increases.
Previous studies of the social returns to education include Rauch (1993), Mare (1995),
Peri (1998), and Moretti (1999), who estimate the e¤ect of average schooling in US cities
on individual wages, and Topel (1999), who estimates social returns using cross-country
data on education and labor productivity. Rauch, Mare, and Peri treat both individual
and average schooling variables as exogenous. In contrast, Moretti (1999) instruments
for average schooling with changes in city age structure, tuition costs and the presence
of a land-grant college, though he treats individual schooling as exogenous. We show
2that instrumenting average schooling but not individual schooling may also be misleading
if instrumental variables (IV) estimates of private returns di¤er from OLS estimates.
Another di¤erence between our paper and Moretti’s is that compulsory schooling laws
mainly a¤ected pupils in middle school or high school, while most of the variation in
Moretti’s sample comes through changes in college attendance and graduation.
The next section lays out a simple economic model that shows how human capital
externalities can generate social returns to schooling. We focus on human capital exter-
nalities because they play an important role in recent discussions of economic growth (e.g.,
Lucas, 1988). The model is used to develop an estimation framework and to highlight
the econometric issues raised in attempts to separate private from social e¤ects. Section 3
discusses the data and reports OLS estimates from regressions on individual and average
schooling. Section 4 describes the CSL instruments, Section 5 reports the IV estimates,
and Section 6 estimates the impact of greater supply of education on private returns to
schooling.
2 Social returns: theory and measurement
2.1 Theoretical framework
A model similar to Acemoglu (1996) is used to highlight the economic forces that may
generate social returns to education, and to derive an estimating equation. Consider an
economy lasting two periods, with production only in the second period, and a continuum
of workers normalized to 1. An individual’s human capital is given by
hi =e x p ( ´i ¢ si);
where si is worker i’s schooling. Workers have unobserved ability ´i = µi´(si),w h i c h
depends on an individual characteristic, µi, and also potentially on schooling. This de-
pendence captures potential decreasing returns to individual schooling, as in Lang (1993).
A worker’s consumption, Ci, is equal to his labor income. Schooling is chosen by







The parameter Ãi is the cost of education for individual i and can be interpreted as a
personal discount rate, along the lines of Card (1995a).
3There is also a continuum of risk-neutral …rms. In period 1, …rms make an irreversible
investment decision, k,a tc o s trk. Workers and …rms come together in the second period.
The labor market is not competitive; instead, …rms and workers are matched randomly,
and each …rm meets a worker. The only decision workers and …rms make after matching is
whether to produce together or not to produce at all (since there are no further periods).






where ®<1, º · 1 ¡ ®, and the worker receives a share ¯ of this output as a result of
bargaining.
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of schooling choices for workers and a set of
physical capital investments for …rms. Firm j maximizes the following expected pro…t
function:




i] ¡ r ¢ kj; (3)
with respect to kj. Since …rms do not know which worker they will be matched with,
their expected pro…t is an average of pro…ts from di¤erent skill levels. The function (3) is
strictly concave, so all …rms choose the same level of capital investment, kj = k,g i v e nb y
k =
µ







i]=E[exp(º ¢ ´i ¢ si)]
is the measure of aggregate human capital. Substituting (4) into (2), and recalling that






(exp(´isi))º. Taking logs, this is:
lnWi = c +
®
1 ¡ ®




lnH + º lnhi;
where c is a constant and ®
1¡® and º are positive coe¢cients.1
1As in Acemoglu (1996), human capital externalitites are additive in logs, so the marginal product of
a more skilled worker increases when the average workforce skill level increases. Acemoglu (1998, 1999)
discuss models in which log wage di¤erences between skilled and unskilled workers increase with average
skill levels.
4Human capital externalities arise here because …rms choose their physical capital in
anticipation of the average human capital of the workers they will employ in the future.
Since physical and human capital are complements in this setup, a more educated labor
force leads to greater investment in physical capital and to higher wages. In the absence
of the need for search and matching, …rms would immediately hire workers with skills
appropriate to their investments, and there would be no human capital externalities.2
The model is completed by individual schooling decisions, which are determined by
maximizing (1), taking (5) as given. This yields equilibrium schooling levels satisfying
ºµi[´(si)+si´












where "´ is the elasticity of the function ´. The population average return to optimally
chosen schooling levels is E[ºµi(´i(si)+si´0
i(si))]. But the average return for particular
subpopulations interacts with discount rates in a manner noted by Lang (1993) and Card
(1995a). For example, if ´0(si) < 0, those with high Ãi will get less schooling, and a
marginal year of schooling will be worth more to such people than the population average
return.
Equation (5) provides the theoretical basis for our empirical work. Since H is unob-
served, however, we use the following approximation to write lnH as a function of average
schooling:
lnH =l nE[exp(º´isi)] ¼ c0 + c1E(´isi) ¼ c2 + c3E(si):
The …rst step approximates the mean of the log with the log of the mean. The second step
takes E(´i) and the covariance between ´i and si to be constant, una¤ected by changes
in average education. Estimation can therefore be based on the following equation for
individual i residing in state j:
lnWij ¼ °0 + °1Sj + °2´isi (7)
where Sj = E(si) is average schooling in state j.
The scenario outlined here is not the only mechanism that might generate a relation-
ship like (7). One possibility, noted by Marshall (1964), Jacobs (1970), and Lucas (1988),
2In a frictionless world, …rms maximize pro…ts conditional on realized worker-…rm matches instead






and worker i’s wage is lnWi = c0 + º®
1¡® lnhi.
5is that workers learn from each other in local labor markets. There can also be (local)
human capital externalities if more educated workers produce higher quality intermediate
goods, and monopolistically competitive upstream and downstream producers locate in
the same area. Our empirical strategy does not attempt to distinguish between these
mechanisms and the one outlined in this section, since they have similar implications.
2.2 Econometric framework
This section discusses instrumental-variables strategies to estimate equation (7), the
causal relationship of interest.3 In practice, of course, there are many factors beside
schooling that determine wages. An error term is therefore added to the estimating
equation. Also, we adopt notation that re‡ects the fact that di¤erent individuals are
observed in di¤erent years in our data. The resulting equation is
Yijt = X
0
i¹ + ±j + ±t + °1Sjt + °2isi + ujt + "i; (8)
where Yijt is the log weekly wage, ujt is a state-year error component, and "i is an individ-
ual error term. The vector Xi includes state-of-birth and year-of-birth e¤ects, and ±j and
±t are state-of-residence and Census year e¤ects. The random coe¢cient on individual
schooling is °2i ´ °2´i,w h i l et h ec o e ¢ c i e n to na v e r a g es c h o o l i n g ,°1; is taken to be …xed.
The most important identi…cation problem raised by equation (8) is omitted variables
bias from correlation between average schooling and other state-year e¤ects embodied
in the error component ujt. For example, economic growth may increase wages in a
state, while also increasing the demand for schooling. To solve this problem, the CSLs
that di¤erent cohorts were exposed to at age 14 are used to construct instruments for
Sjt: CSL instruments are correlated with individual schooling because di¤erent cohorts
in each state were exposed to di¤erent CSLs. Since people tend to live in their states of
birth, this generates correlation with average schooling in states of residence
While omitted state-year e¤ects are the primary motivation for this IV strategy, the
fact that one regressor, Sjt, is the average of another regressor, si, also complicates the
interpretation of OLS estimates. To see this, consider an “atheoretical” regression of
Yij on both si and Sj, which for purposes of illustration is assumed to have constant
3Brock and Durlauf (1999) survey non-instrumental variables approaches to estimating models with
social e¤ects.
6coe¢cients and a cross-section dimension only:
Yij = ¹
¤ + ¼0si + ¼1Sj + »i; where E[»isi]=E[»iSj] ´ 0: (9)
Now, let ½0 denote the coe¢cient from a bivariate regression of Yij on si only and let ½1
denote the coe¢cient from a bivariate regression of Yij on Sj only. Note that ½1 is the
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate of the coe¢cient on si in a bivariate regression of
Yij on si using a full set of state dummies as instruments. Appendix A shows that
¼0 = ½1 + Á(½0 ¡ ½1) (10)
¼1 = Á(½1 ¡ ½0)
where Á = 1
1¡R2 > 1; and R2 is the R-squared from a regression of si on state dummies.
Thus, if for any reason OLS estimates of the bivariate regression di¤er from 2SLS esti-
mates using state-dummy instruments, the coe¢cient on average schooling in (9) will be
nonzero. For example, if grouping corrects for attenuation bias due to measurement error
in si,w ew o u l dh a v e½1 >½ 0 and the appearance of positive social returns even when
°1 =0in (8). In contrast, if grouping eliminates correlation between si and unobserved
earnings potential, we would have ½1 <½ 0, and the appearance of negative social returns.4
The interpretation of OLS estimates is complicated even further when returns to educa-
tion vary across individuals, as in our random coe¢cients speci…cation, (8). Nevertheless,
an instrumental variables strategy that treats both si and Sj as endogenous can generate
consistent estimates of social returns. The key to the success of this approach is …nding
the right instrument for individual schooling.
To develop this point more formally, consider a simpli…ed version of the random co-
e¢cient model (8), again with no covariates and no time dimension. Assume also that
a single binary instrument is available to estimate °1,s a yzi; a dummy for having been
born in a state with restrictive CSLs. Finally, suppose we adjust for the e¤ects of si by
subtracting °¤
2si; where °¤
2 is some average of °2i. In other words, subtract °¤
2si from
both sides of (8) to obtain
Yij ¡ °
¤
2si ´ e Yij (11)
= ¹ + °1Sj +[ uj + "i +( °2i ¡ °
¤
2)si]:
4The coe¢cient on average schooling in an equation with individual schooling can be interpreted as
the Hausman (1978) test statistic for the equality of OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates of private returns
to schooling using state dummies as instruments. Borjas (1992) discusses a similar bias in the estimation
of ethnic-background e¤ects.
7What value of °¤
2 allows us to use zi as an instrument for Sj in (11) to obtain a consistent
estimate of °1? The instrumental variables estimand in this case, °IV





E[e Yijjzi =1 ]¡ E[e Yijjzi =0 ]
E[Sjjzi =1 ]¡ E[Sjjzi =0 ]
= °1 +
·
E[°2isijzi =1 ]¡ E[°2isijzi =0 ]







E[sijzi =1 ]¡ E[sijzi =0 ]
E[Sjjzi =1 ]¡ E[Sjjzi =0 ]
¸
:
This shows that °IV
1 estimates social returns to education consistently (i.e., equals °1)i f




E[°2isijzi =1 ]¡ E[°2isijzi =0 ]
E[sijzi =1 ]¡ E[sijzi =0 ]
(12)
=
E[(Yij ¡ °1Sj)jzi =1 ]¡ E[(Yij ¡ °1Sj)jzi =0 ]
E[sijzi =1 ]¡ E[sijzi =0 ]
:
In other words, the adjustment for e¤ects of si should use the (population) IV estimate of
private returns generated by zi, once we subtract the e¤ect of human capital externalities.
Of course, we cannot use zi to estimate both private and social returns, even though
(12) appears to require this. But instruments based on quarter of birth can be used to
estimate °¤
2: Let qi denote a single instrument derived from quarter of birth, say a dummy




E[Yijjqi =1 ]¡ E[Yijjqi =0 ]
E[sijzi =1 ]¡ E[sijzi =0 ]
=
E[°2isijqi =1 ]¡ E[°2isijqi =0 ]




2; the quarter-of-birth instrument provides an appropriate adjustment for private
returns in (11).5
To see why °¤
q should be close to °¤
2,l e twi(si) ´ °2isi, and note that w0
i(si) is the
causal e¤ect of schooling on i’s (log) wages with Sj …xed (see equation (8)). Also, let s1i
denote the schooling i would get if zi =1 ,a n dl e ts0i denote the schooling i would get if
5In practice, we have more than one CSL instrument, so it may be possible to use CSLs to instrument
si and Sjt simultaneously. Note, however, that because of the group structure of Sjt and the CSL
instruments, the projection of si on the CSL instruments is almost identical to the projection of Sjt on
the CSL instruments. This is not a problem with quarter of birth instruments since they are independent
of Sjt.






i(¾)j s1i ¸ ¾>s 0i]P[s1i ¸ ¾>s 0i]d¾ R
P[s1i ¸ ¾>s 0i]d¾
; (13)
which is an average derivative with weighting function P[s1i ¸ ¾>s 0i]=P[si · ¾jzi =
0] ¡ P[si · ¾jzi =1 ] : In other words, IV estimation using zi produces an average of
the derivative w0
i(¾), with weight given to each value ¾ in proportion to the instrument-
induced change in the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of schooling at that point.
Similarly, °¤
q is a CDF-weighted average with s1i and s0i d e … n e dt oc o r r e s p o n dt ot h e
values of qi.
CSL instruments and quarter of birth instruments both estimate individual returns
for people whose schooling is a¤ected by compulsory schooling laws—i.e., individuals who
would have otherwise dropped out of school. So the weighting functions P[si · ¾jzi =
0] ¡ P[si · ¾jzi =1 ]and P[si · ¾jqi =0 ]¡ P[si · ¾jqi =1 ]should be similar. In
fact, we show below that, like quarter of birth instruments, CSLs changed the distribution
of schooling primarily in the 8-12 range. This suggests that °¤
q and °¤
2 capture similar
features of the causal relationship between individual schooling and earnings.
3D a t a a n d O L S e s t i m a t e s
3.1 Data sources
Most of the analysis uses an extract of US-born white males aged 40-49 from the 1960-
80 Census microdata samples. These samples were chosen because they include data
on quarter of birth, and are limited to groups on the ‡attest part of the age-earnings
pro…les.7 This reduces bias from age or experience e¤ects when using quarter-of-birth
dummies as instruments. We also look at samples that include data from the 1950 and
1990 Censuses. Because these censuses do not include quarter of birth, estimates using
6These potential schooling choices can be described in terms of the theoretical framework. Suppose,
for example, that ´(si)=´ and the CSL instrument changes discount rates from Ã0i or Ã1i as in Card
(1995a). Using (6), individual schooling choices would be s0i =
ºµi´
Ã0i and s1i =
ºµi´
Ã1i :
7Data are from the following IPUMS …les (documented in Ruggles and Sobek, 1997): the 1 percent
sample for 1960, Form 1 and Form 2 State samples for 1970 (givinga2p e r c e n ts a m p l e ) ,a n dt h e
5 percent PUMS-A sample for 1980. The 1950 sample includes all Sample Line individuals in the
relevant age/sex/race group, and the 1990 data are from the IPUMS self-weighting 1 percent …le. Stacked
regressions are weighted so that each year gets equal weight. For additional information, see Appendix
B.
9the extended sample must treat individual schooling as exogenous. A second problem
with the 1990 data is that the schooling variable is categorical.
The schooling variable for individuals in 1950-80 data is highest grade completed,
capped at 17 years to impose a uniform topcode across censuses. Average schooling in
a state and year is measured as the average of the capped highest grade completed for
the full sample of workers aged 16-64 (i.e., not limited to white men). The averages
are weighted by individuals’ weeks worked the previous year. For 1990 data, we assigned
average years of schooling to categorical values using the imputation for white men in
Park (1994). Average schooling in 1990 is the average capped value of this imputed years
of schooling variable.8
The relevant “labor market” for the estimation of equation (8) is taken to be a state.
Previous work on social returns in the US has used cities, while macroeconomic studies
of education and growth have used countries (see, e.g., Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992;
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Bils and Klenow, 1998; Topel, 1999; or Krueger and
Lindahl, 1999). We use states because all three PUMS samples record state of residence
while the 1960 and part of the 1970 PUMS fail to identify cities or metropolitan areas.
Since the instruments used here are derived from individuals’ states of birth and not their
cities of birth, little is lost from this aggregation.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the extract. The average age is constant across
censuses, while average schooling increases by slightly less than a year between 1950-60,
and by slightly more than a year between 1960-70, 1970-80 and 1980-90. The mean of
state average schooling, shown in the row below individual schooling, refers to the entire
working age population. The standard deviation of average schooling indicates the extent
of variation in this average across states. The next two rows record the lowest and highest
average schooling. For example, in 1980 the lowest average education was 11.8 years,
in Kentucky, while Washington, DC had the highest average education at 13.1. The
last eight rows of Table 1 report the fraction in each census a¤ected by child labor and
compulsory attendance laws as we have coded them. We discuss these variables in detail
in Section 4, below.
8Only 1 percent samples are used for the calculation of averages. Alternative weighting schemes for
measures of average schooling (e.g., unweighted) generated similar results.
103.2 OLS estimates
OLS estimates of private returns are similar to those reported elsewhere, and do not
change much with controls for average schooling. For example, the estimates show a
marked increase in schooling coe¢cients between 1980 and 1990. This can be seen in
Table 2, which reports OLS estimates of models with and without Sjt,u s i n gp o o l e d
samples, and separately by census year. The pooled regressions include state of residence
e¤ects, year e¤ects, year of birth e¤ects, and state of birth e¤ects. Regressions using
the individual censuses omit state of residence e¤ects. All standard errors reported in
the paper are corrected for state-year clustering using the formula in Moulton (1986).
Corrected standard errors are as much as two times larger than uncorrected standard
errors because of the group structure of some of the instruments and regressors.
OLS estimates of social returns for 1960-80 imply that a one-year increase in state av-
erage schooling is associated with a .073 increase in the wages of all workers in that state.
Using data from 1950-80 generates an estimate of .061, whereas the 1950-90 sample leads
to an estimated social return of .072. These are similar to Moretti’s (1999) estimates of
social returns using within-city variation, which range from .08 to .13. The estimates in
Table 2 using single censuses are from models without state e¤ects. The resulting coe¢-
cients on average schooling are considerably larger, suggesting that at least some of the
relationship between average schooling and wages is due to omitted state characteristics.9
4 Compulsory schooling laws and schooling
4.1 Construction of CSL variables
The CSL instruments were coded from information on …ve types of restrictions related to
school attendance and work permits that were in force at the time census respondents were
aged 14. These restrictions specify the maximum age for school enrollment (enroll_age);
the minimum dropout age (drop_age); the minimum schooling required before dropping
out (req_sch); the minimum age for a work permit (work_age); and the minimum
schooling required for a work permit (work_sch). Information was collected for every
3-6 years from 1914-65, and missing years were interpolated by extending older data. For
9Rauch (1993) reports cross-section estimates around .05 using data from the 1980 Census. These
estimates are not directly comparable to ours because Rauch’s model includes occupation dummies and
average experience.
11example, data for cohorts aged 14 in 1924-28 come from a source for 1924. Sources for
the CSLs are documented in the data appendix.
The …ve CSLs vary considerably over time and across states. This can be seen in
Table 3, which reports the mean and standard deviation for each CSL component in the
years for which we have CSL data. Statistics in the table are averages using micro data;
that is, they weight state requirements using the sample distribution of states for each
cohort. The data show that compulsory attendance requirements have generally been
growing more restrictive, with the maximum enrollment age falling and the minimum
dropout age rising. The minimum age for work has also increased. The cross-section
variability in age requirements for dropout and work permits has fallen over time.
Margo and Finnegan (1996) show that in the 1900s, child labor laws were at least
as important as attendance restrictions for educational attainment, and the evidence pre-
sented in Schmidt (1996) suggests the same for 1920-1935.10 This is probably because,
historically, the main reason for leaving school was to work. We therefore combine the
…ve CSL components into two variables, one summarizing compulsory attendance laws
and one summarizing child labor laws. Compulsory attendance laws are summarized as
the minimum years in school required before leaving school, taking account of age require-
ments. This is the larger of schooling required before dropping out and the di¤erence
between the minimum dropout age and the maximum enrollment age:
CA =m a xfreq_sch; drop_age ¡ enroll_ageg
Similarly, child labor laws are summarized as the minimum years in school required before
work is permitted. This is the larger of schooling required before receiving a work permit
and the di¤erence between the minimum work age and the maximum enrollment age:
CL =m a xfwork_sch; work_age ¡ enroll_ageg
These variables combine the CSLs into two measures that are highly related to educational
attainment both conceptually and empirically.
Over 95 percent of men aged 40-49 in both the 1960-80 and 1950-90 censuses have
CL in the 6-9 range, while CA is concentrated in the 8-12 range, with almost no one in
the “11” category. The distribution of CL and CA can therefore be captured using four
10Edwards (1978), Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), Lang and Kropp (1986), and Angrist and Krueger
(1991) also present evidence that compulsory schooling laws a¤ect schooling.
12dummies for each variable. For CL, the dummies are:
CL6 for CL · 6;
CL7 for CL =7 ;
CL8 for CL =8 ;
CL9 for CL ¸ 9:
Similarly, for CA, the dummies are:
CA8 for CA · 8;
CA9 for CA =9 ;
CA10 for CA =1 0 ;
CA11 for CA ¸ 11:
Proportions in each group are reported with the descriptive statistics in Table 1. In the
empirical work, the omitted categories are the least restrictive groups for CL and CA.
4.2 CSL e¤ects on individual schooling
There is a large and statistically signi…cant relationship between individual schooling
and both sets of CSL dummies. This is shown in Table 4a, which reports results from
regressions of individual schooling on CL7 ¡ CL9 and CA9 ¡ CA11,a l o n gw i t hy e a r
e¤ects, year of birth e¤ects, and state of birth e¤ects. For example, the entry in column
1 shows that in the 1960-80 sample, men born in states with a child labor law that required
9 years in school before allowing work ended up with .26 more years of school completed
than those born in states that required 6 or fewer years. The results are similar in models
that do not include state-of-residence e¤ects.
The right half of Table 4a shows that adding 1950 Census data to the sample leads
to CSL e¤ects similar or slightly smaller than those estimated in the 1960-80 data alone.
Incorporating both 1950 and 1990 data leads to larger e¤ects. Also, the relationship
between CSLs and schooling is larger and more precisely estimated in samples that pool
three or more censuses than in a sample using 1980 data only. For example, column 4
shows that with 1980 data alone, the e¤ect of CL9, though still statistically signi…cant,
falls to .17.
Overall, the estimates re‡ect a pattern consistent with the notion that more restrictive
laws caused higher educational attainment. This pattern can be seen in Figures 1 and 2,
13which plot di¤erences in the probability that educational attainment is at or exceeds the
g r a d el e v e lo nt h eX - a x i s( i . e . ,o n em i n u st h eC D F ) . T h ed i ¤ e r e n c e sa r eb e t w e e nm e n
exposed to di¤erent CSLs in the 1960-80 sample, with men exposed to the least restrictive
CSLs as the reference group.
Figure 1 shows that men who were exposed to more restrictive child labor laws were
1-6 percentage points more likely to complete grades 8-12. These di¤erences decline at
lower grades, and drop o¤ sharply after grade 12. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern
for compulsory attendance laws. If CSLs cause schooling changes, and not vice versa, we
would in fact expect the impact of these laws to primarily shift the distribution of schooling
in middle- and high-school grades. On the other hand, if the laws pick up omitted factors
related to macroeconomic conditions, tastes for schooling, or family background, we might
have found that more restrictive CSLs increase the proportion attending college as well
as the proportion completing high school.11
Table 4b quanti…es the CDF di¤erences plotted in the …gures for 1960-80 and shows
analogous results for the 1950-80 sample. The table reports CSL coe¢cients in regres-
sions of dummy variables for whether an individual has completed the level of schooling
indicated in the column heading. All of the positive di¤erences for grades 8-12 are statis-
tically signi…cant. The negative di¤erences at schooling levels above 12 are smaller and
less likely to be signi…cant. The estimates in the table also suggest that child labor laws
shifted the distribution of schooling at younger grades more than compulsory attendance
laws. This too is consistent with a causal interpretation of the relationship between
CSLs and schooling since child labor laws refer to lower schooling levels than compulsory
attendance laws. Interestingly, we replicate Margo and Finnegan’s (1996) …nding for the
1900s that child labor laws have been more important for educational attainment than
compulsory attendance laws.
For the most part, the CDF di¤erences in the …gures and in Table 4b are ordered by
increasing severity, as would be expected if these di¤erences re‡ect increasingly restrictive
laws. For example, using 1960-80 data, the di¤erence at grade 9 for men with CL9=1
exceeds the di¤erence for men with CL8=1 . This in turn exceeds the di¤erence for men
with CL7=1 . Adding 1950 data leaves this pattern unchanged.
11Up to 12th grade, the CSLs increase schooling above required levels. For example, CL9 makes
high-school graduation more likely. This may re‡ect “lumpiness” of schooling decisions, peer e¤ects, or
the fact that our coding is imperfect. Lang and Kropp (1986) note that educational sorting might also
lead people not a¤ected directly by CSLs to change their schooling when CSLs change.
14A …nal noteworthy feature of the …gures is their similarity to di¤erences in the CDF
of schooling induced by quarter of birth (as reported in Angrist and Imbens, 1995). Like
CSLs, quarter of birth changes the distribution of schooling primarily in the 8-12 grade
range. This supports our claim that CSL instruments and quarter of birth instruments
are likely to generate similar estimates of the private return to schooling, since, as noted in
Section 2.2, IV estimates implicitly weight individual causal e¤ects using CDF di¤erences.
4.3 Private returns to education
Table 4a shows that CSLs are an important determinant of individual schooling, so, in
principle, they can be used as instruments for individual schooling in wage equations. On
the other hand, if there are social returns to schooling, IV estimates of private returns
using CSL instruments will be biased because the instruments will pick up the e¤ect
of state average schooling on earnings.12 In fact, one simple test for social returns is
to compare estimates using quarter of birth instruments, which are uncorrelated with
average education, to estimates using CSL instruments.
Table 5 reports 2SLS estimates of the private returns to schooling using three di¤erent
sets of instruments. Using 30 quarter of birth/year of birth dummies, the private return
to schooling is estimated at .073 (with a standard error of .012). This is less than the
Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimate from a similar speci…cation using 1980 data only.
Columns 2 and 3 show that the discrepancy is explained by the fact that 1960 and 1970
data generate smaller quarter-of-birth estimates than the 1980 sample.13
Estimates of private returns using CSL instruments in the 1960-80 sample exceed those
using quarter of birth instruments, though the di¤erences are not large or statistically
signi…cant. The 2SLS estimate of private returns using CL6 ¡ CL8 as instruments,
reported in column 4, is .076 (s.e.=.034). Using CA8¡CA10 as instruments generates an
estimate of .092 (s.e.=.044), shown in column 7. Models estimated using CSL instruments
without state of residence e¤ects produce similar but less precise estimates. This loss of
precision re‡ects the impact of state-year clustering on the corrected standard errors.
12Similarly, positive social returns may also bias IV estimates of private returns using aggregate distance
instruments, as in Card (1995b).
13Bound, et al (1995) note that with many instruments, 2SLS estimates may be biased towards OLS
estimates, and argue that this is a problem for some of the speci…cations reported by Angrist and Krueger
(1991). However, re-analyses of these data by, among others, Chamberlain and Imbens (1996), Stock and
Staiger (1997), and Angrist and Krueger (1995), suggest that using 3 quarter of birth dummies interacted
with 10 year of birth dummies as instruments produces approximately unbiased estimates.
15Although we present a more detailed analysis below, the fact that quarter of birth
and CSL instruments generate similar schooling coe¢cients in the 1960-80 data already
suggests that social returns are modest in this period. As noted above, signi…cant social
returns would likely lead to estimates of private returns that are biased upwards when
using CSL instruments, since CSLs are correlated with average schooling. Quarter of
birth instruments, on the other hand, are not subject to this bias.
Estimates adding 1950 and 1990 data use only CSL instruments, and not quarter of
birth. Adding 1950 data to the sample leads to somewhat larger estimates with CL in-
struments. Adding 1990 data as well leads to even larger estimates using CLinstruments,
and to a substantial increase in precision with both sets of instruments. On the other
hand, the estimates using CA instruments are remarkably insensitive to the inclusion of
1950 and 1990 data.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the IV estimates using quarter of birth are very close to
the OLS estimates for the same period; compare, for example, the estimates of .073 in
column 1 of Table 5 and column 1 of Table 2. Thus, estimates of social returns that treat
individual schooling as exogenous and endogenous should give similar results, at least for
the 1960-80 sample.
5 Social returns to education
5.1 Results for 1960-80
The bottom panel of Table 6 shows the relationship between CSL dummies and average
schooling in 1960-80 data. The …rst-stage equations include year, year of birth, state of
birth, and state of residence dummies. CSL e¤ects are identi…ed in these models because
cohorts born in di¤erent years in the same state were exposed to di¤erent laws. The e¤ect
of CSL dummies on average schooling is similar to, though typically somewhat smaller
than, the corresponding e¤ect on individual schooling. A moderately weaker relationship
is not surprising since the average schooling variables refer to a broader group than our
sample of white men in their 40s.
The instrumental variables estimates reported in the top half of the table are from
models that treat both si and Sjt as endogenous. Using quarter of birth and child labor
laws as instruments generates a private return of .074 (s.e.=.012) and a social return of
.003 (s.e.=.040). This is considerably smaller, though less precise, than the corresponding
16OLS estimate of social returns. The 90 percent con…dence interval for social returns, [-
.065, .066], excludes the OLS estimate of .073 (see Table 2). Using compulsory attendance
laws as instruments generates a somewhat higher social return, not signi…cantly di¤erent
from OLS estimates, but still considerably lower at .017 (s.e.=.043). Note, however, that
the …rst stage for average schooling using CA9¡CA11 is not as sharply patterned as the
…rst stage using CL7 ¡ CL9.
Using both sets of CSL dummies as instruments generates a more precisely estimated
social return of .004 (s.e.=.035). The 90 percent con…dence interval for this estimate
is [-.053, .061], which now comfortably excludes the OLS estimate. Finally, column 4
reports results using both CL and CA dummies, and a full set of interactions between
them, as instruments. This is useful because child labor and compulsory attendance laws
may work together to encourage students to stay in school longer. The results in this
case are somewhat more precise than estimates that do not use the interaction terms as
instruments, showing social returns of 0.005 with standard error of .033.
Earlier we argued that it is important to use the “right” private return to adjust for
individual schooling when estimating social returns. On the other hand, the IV estimates
of private returns in columns 1-4 of Table 6 are remarkably close to the OLS estimates of
private returns reported in Table 2. This suggests that estimates of social returns from
models that treat individual schooling as exogenous may not be biased. Columns 5-8 in
Table 6 report estimates from models that treat individual schooling as exogenous and
drop the quarter of birth instruments. The estimates of social returns in columns 5-8
are indeed similar to those in columns 1-4, though slightly more precise. For example,
the estimated social return using CL dummies is .002 (s.e.=.038). With both sets of
CSL dummies, the estimated social return is .005 (s.e.=.032), while adding interactions
between the two sets of dummies generates slightly negative social returns with a standard
error of .03. Overall, the results in Table 6 o¤er no evidence for substantial social returns
to education.
5.2 Additional estimates
Regardless of changes in sample and model speci…cation, IV estimates using child labor
laws fail to generate evidence of signi…cant social returns,. This is documented in Table
7, which reports …rst- and second-stage estimates in subsamples, and results from models
that allow private returns to vary by census year and state. An analysis in subsamples is
17worth checking since men aged 40-49 in the 1970 Census served in World War II, while
those in the 1960 Census were in school during the Great Depression. Allowing for
di¤erent private returns is useful since there is region and time variation in the private
returns to schooling.
Estimates of social returns using child labor laws as instruments (CL7¡CL9) change
little when the sample is limited to 1960 and 1980, or to 1970 and 1980. Moreover, the
…rst-stage estimates in these samples still show more restrictive CSLs leading to higher
average schooling. These results can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 7. Models
where private returns vary by year and state were estimated treating individual schooling
as exogenous. Allowing private returns to vary by year generates an estimated social
return of .007 (s.e.=.036), shown in column 4, while allowing private returns to vary by
year and state generates an estimate of -.024 (s.e.=.039), reported in column 5.
If IV estimates of private returns were actually larger than OLS estimates, as sug-
gested by results in some of the studies surveyed by Card (1999), then the estimates of
social returns computed here would be biased upward (see section 2.2). To illustrate the
implications of a higher IV estimate of private returns, we estimated social returns im-
posing a private return of .08 or .09 (i.e., using Yijt¡:08si or Yijt¡:09si as the dependent
variable). The estimated social returns in this case, reported in columns 6 and 7, are
even smaller than the estimates in columns 1-5. With private returns of 9 percent, for
example, the social return is estimated to be -.018 (s.e.=.039).
Results from variations on the basic speci…cation using compulsory attendance instru-
ments (CA9¡CA11) are reported in panel B of Table 7. Estimates using 1960 and 1980
data only or 1970 and 1980 data only are notably larger than the estimates using CL
instruments reported in panel A. But controlling for private returns that vary by year
leads to considerably smaller estimates, and controlling for private returns that vary by
state and year leads to a negative social return. Overall, therefore, the results in Table
7 largely reinforce the …nding of no social returns in Table 6.14
14A possible concern with the estimates in Tables 6 and 7 is that CSL dummies are correlated with
measures of school quality. But since school quality is associated with higher wages, the omission of
these variables could not be responsible for the apparent lack of a social return to education. In fact,
controlling for the school quality variables used by Card and Krueger (1992a) leads to more negative
estimates, though also less precise, than in our baseline speci…cation. It should be noted, however, that
even conditional on quality variables, there is a clear …rst-stage relationship between CSLs and average
schooling.
185.3 Results using 1950 and 1990 data
Individual schooling is treated as exogenous in analyses using 1950 and 1990 data, since
there is no quarter of birth information in these data sets. In principle, this may lead to
biased estimates, although in practice, the estimates of social returns for 1960-80 are not
sensitive to the exogeneity assumption. A second and potentially more serious problem
is that the schooling variable in the 1990 Census is categorical, with no direct information
on highest grade completed, so we have to use an imputed years of schooling measure for
1990. Since individual schooling has to be treated as exogenous when using 1990 data,
the resulting measurement error may lead to biased estimates of social returns (see the
discussion in Section 2.2).15
Table 8 reports estimates of social returns in the extended samples. Using child labor
laws as instruments generates small positive or zero estimates of social returns with 1950-
80 data. These estimates are more precise than those using 1960-80 data only. In
column 1, for example, the estimated social return is .009 with a standard error of .025.
As before, using compulsory attendance laws as instruments leads to somewhat larger
estimates. But these estimates are less precise than those using CL instruments, and the
…rst-stage relationships are not uniformly consistent with a causal interpretation of the
correlation between CSLs and schooling. For example, in column 1, CA9 has a larger
coe¢cient than both CA10 and CA11. Moreover, allowing private returns to schooling
to vary by year and state leads to an estimated social return of only .017.
In contrast with the results using 1950-80 data, adding data from the 1990 census
leads to statistically signi…cant positive estimates of social returns when child labor laws
are used as instruments. For example, the baseline estimate reported in column 2 shows a
social return of .048 with a standard error of .02. Controlling for separate private returns
by census year leads to an even larger social return of .074. Using CA instruments does
not lead to signi…cant estimates of social returns in the 1950-90 sample, though again the
estimates using CA dummies are considerably less precise than the estimates using CL
dummies.
The relatively large and precise social return estimates for 1950-90 generated by CL
instruments may signal a change in the social value of human capital. But this result
could also re‡ect the switch to a categorical schooling variable in 1990. The econometric
discussion in Section 2.2 highlights the possibility of spurious social return estimates when
15A detailed description of the schooling variables used here appears in Appendix B.
19the impact of individual schooling is poorly controlled. Measurement error in the 1990
schooling variable could generate a problem of this type.
To check whether measurement problems could be responsible for the 1950-90 results,
we assigned mean values from the 1980 Census to a categorical schooling variable available
in the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses. This variable is similar to the categorical 1990
variable. We then re-estimated social returns in 1960-80 treating the imputed individual
schooling variable as exogenous.16 This leads to markedly larger estimates of social
returns. For example, using CL instruments to estimate social returns with imputed
schooling data generates a social return of .024 instead of the estimate of .003 reported in
Table 6. Similarly, using CA instruments generates a social return of .034 instead of .017
with the better-measured schooling variable. These results suggest that the higher social
returns estimated with 1990 data are likely due to changes in the way the education data
were collected in 1990.
6 Changes in returns to schooling
In addition to a¤ecting overall wage levels, changes in average schooling may a¤ect the
private returns to schooling. Mechanisms for this include externalities of the type dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. Suppose, for example, equation (2) is replaced by a general function
F(kj;h i).A s s u m i n g F(kj;h i) is concave in kj,a l l… r m sc h o o s et h es a m el e v e lo fc a p i t a l .
This level is an increasing function of aggregate human capital, say, k = G[H].L o g
wages can therefore be written as
lnWi ¼ c +l nF(G[H];h i)
This more general functional form induces interaction terms between H and individual
schooling, unless F is Cobb-Douglas as in Section 2.1. This can be viewed as generating a
version of the additive social returns model, (7), where the coe¢cient on average schooling
is a random function of hi. Instrumental variables methods then estimate a weighted
average of this random coe¢cient (see, for example, Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens, 1995).
A second and perhaps more important consideration is that even in frictionless com-
petitive labor markets, the private returns to education change with average schooling
when high and low education workers are imperfect substitutes (see, e.g., Freeman, 1976
16This exercise uses the IPUMS variable EDUCREC, which provides a uniform categorical schooling
measure for the 1940-90 Censuses.
20and Katz and Murphy, 1992). In a neoclassical framework, part of what we are calling
social returns includes a combination of declining returns to schooling and increased wages
for less-educated workers in response to the increased supply of more-educated workers.
In the appendix, we show that, as a theoretical matter, the net impact of these forces
is to make the overall social return in an additive model larger. But since the impact
of increasing education supplies is of independent interest, we brie‡y present empirical
results from models with interaction terms between individual and average schooling.17
When estimating models that include interactions terms between si and Sjt; the Sjt
main e¤ects and interactions are treated as endogenous, and instrumented with CSL
dummies and interactions between si and CSL dummies. For the purposes of this analysis,
the si main e¤ect was treated as exogenous. The interaction term is parameterized as
(si ¡ 11) ¢ (Sjt ¡ 11), so the reported main e¤ects are evaluated at 11 years of schooling.
This is appropriate because CSL instruments have a large e¤ect on high school graduation
rates and because mean schooling is between 11-12 years. The models also include
interactions between si and year and state main e¤ects. This leads to a setup similar to
Card and Krueger’s (1992b) study of school quality, where the returns to schooling vary
with cohort- and state-speci…c characteristics, conditional on additive cohort and state
e¤ects.
Panel A of Table 9 reports main e¤ects and interaction terms estimated using 1960-80
data. The OLS estimates of social returns are about .05, and the interaction term suggests
that private returns decline as average schooling levels rise. But both of these …ndings are
reversed in the IV estimates. The social return main e¤ects are negative and insigni…cant.
Perhaps more surprisingly, CLinstruments generate a positive and statistically signi…cant
interaction term of .029 (with other instruments, the interaction term is positive but not
signi…cant). This result is not consistent with a standard competitive model of the labor
market, but it is consistent with a model of the sort discussed above, or in Acemoglu
(1999).
IV estimates of models with interaction terms using the 1950-80 sample, reported in
Panel B, yield social return main e¤ects that are positive, but imprecise and not statis-
tically signi…cant. The interaction term estimated with CL i n s t r u m e n t si sa g a i ns t a t i s -
tically signi…cant, and perhaps of a more plausible magnitude, suggesting that private
returns to schooling increase by about .017 when average schooling increases by one year.
17For similar theoretical reasons, Moretti (1999) also estimates models with interactions between indi-
vidual and average schooling.
21Overall, however, the results with interaction terms are not very precise. We therefore
leave a more detailed investigation of models with interactions between individual and
average schooling for future work.
7 Concluding remarks
Evidence on the returns to education has implications for both economic policy and
economic theory. A large literature reports estimates of private returns to education
on the order of 6-10 percent. However, private returns may be only part of the story.
If there are positive social returns to education, then private returns underestimate the
economic value of schooling.
Identi…cation of social returns requires exogenous variation in both individual and
average schooling. In this paper, we use quarter of birth and state CSLs to generate
this variation. These two sources are conceptually similar, since quarter of birth a¤ects
schooling because of CSLs as well. This identi…cation strategy works because quarter of
birth primarily a¤ects individual schooling, while CSLs a¤ect both individual and average
schooling.
Estimates using CSLs as instruments for average schooling in 1960-80 data generate
statistically insigni…cant social return estimates ranging from -1 to less than 2 percent.
Adding data from 1950 leads to somewhat more precise estimates, without changing
the basic pattern. Regressions using data from the 1990 Census, in contrast, generate
statistically signi…cant estimates of social returns of 4 percent or more with one set of
instruments. This may re‡ect the increased importance of human capital after 1980.
Further investigation, however, suggests that the larger estimates in samples with 1990
data are probably explained by changes in the schooling variable in the 1990 Census. On
balance, therefore, the analysis here o¤ers little evidence for sizeable social returns to
education, at least over the range of variation induced by changing CSLs.
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26Appendix A: Mathematical Details
A.1 Derivation of equation (10)
Rewrite equation (9) as follows
Yij = ¹
¤ + ¼0¿i +( ¼0 + ¼1)Sj + »i;
where ¿i ´ si ¡ Sj: Since ¿i and Sj are uncorrelated by construction, we have:





Simplifying the second line,
¼0 =
C[(si ¡ Sj);Y ij]















V (si) ¡ V (Sj)
¸
= ½0Á + ½1(1 ¡ Á)=½1 + Á(½0 ¡ ½1)
where Á ´
V (si)
V (si)¡V (Sj): Solving for ¼1,w eh a v e
¼1 = ½1 ¡ ¼0 = Á(½1 ¡ ½0):
A.2. Relative Price E¤ects and Social Returns
A key ingredient in models with general equilibrium price e¤ects is less-than-perfect
substitution between labor types. Imperfect substitution is easiest to describe in a world
with two schooling groups. Suppose labor markets are perfectly competitive, and workers







Normalize the price of capital to 1 ¡ ®,s ot h a tK =[ AlL½ + AhH½]
1=½. Substituting
into (14), gives Y =[ AlL½ + AhH½]
1=½. The wages of skilled and unskilled workers can
therefore be written as
wL = Al [Al + Ah(H=L)
½]





27An increase in average schooling is equivalent to an increase in the share of H.
To see the implications of this set-up for our estimates of social returns, normalize the
total population to 1,a n dl e tH = S,s ot h a tL =1¡S. We interpret “social returns” in
this model as the derivative of total log wage income with respect to S minus the e¤ect




where W is the sum of log wages, lnW ´ LlnwL + H lnwH =l nwL + S(lnwH ¡ lnwL),
and ln! =l nwH ¡ lnwL is the private return to schooling. Di¤erentiating, we have
dlnW
dS







This shows that the overall impact of changing S includes (i) the private return to school-
ing; (ii) a negative term due to declining returns to schooling since dln!
dS < 0; (iii) a
positive term re‡ecting increased wages of less-educated workers.








&l (! ¡ 1) (16)
where &l =[ AlL½ + AhH½]
¡1 AlL½ is the share of low education workers in total labor
costs and ¾ ´
1




¾&l (! ¡ 1) is always positive because ! =
wH
wL > 1. Therefore, increases in average
education raise total wages by more than the private return to schooling unless ¾ = 1,
as in the model of Section 2.1. Intuitively, average wages go up by more than private
returns because the wages of less educated workers increase more than enough to o¤set
t h ed e c l i n ei nt h ew a g e so fm o r ee d u c a t e dw o r k e r s .
28Appendix B: Data sources and methods
1. Micro Data
The paper uses data from the 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 PUMS files. Census data were taken from the
IPUMS system (Ruggles and Sobek, 1997).  The files used are as follows:
1950 General (1/330 sample)
1960 General (1% sample)
1970 Form 1 State (1 % sample)
1970 Form 2 State (1% sample)
1980 5% State (A Sample)
1990 1% unweighted (a 1% random self-weighted sample created by IPUMS)
Our initial extract included all US-born white men aged 21-58.  The 1950 sample is limited to “sample line”
individuals (i.e., those with long-form responses).  Our sample excludes men born or living in Alaska or Hawaii. 
Estimates were weighted by the IPUMS weighting variable SLWT, adjusted in the case of 1970 to reflect the fact
that we use two files for that year (i.e., divided by 2).  The weights are virtually constant within years, but vary
slightly to reflect minor adjustments by IPUMS to improve estimation of population totals.
The schooling variable was calculated as follows: For 1950-80, the variable is HIGRADED (General), the
IPUMS recode of highest grade enrolled and grade completed into highest grade completed.  For the 1990 Census,
which has only categorical schooling, we assigned group means for white men from Park (1994, Table 5), who uses
a one-time overlap questionaire from theFeburary 1990 CPS to construct averages for essentially the same Census
categories.  This generates a years of schooling variable roughlt comparable across censuses (GRADCOMP). 
Finally, we censored GRADCOMP at 17 since this is the highest grade completed in the 1950 census.  We call this
variable GRADCAP.  
The dependent variable is log weekly wage, calculated by dividing annual wages by weeks worked, where
wages refer to wage and salary income only.  Wage topcodes vary across censuses.  We imposed a uniform topcode
as follows.  Wage data for every year for the full extract of white men aged 21-58 were censored at the 98th
percentile for that year.  The censoring value is the 98th percentile times 1.5.  Weeks worked are grouped in the
1960 and 1970 censuses.  We assigned means to 1960 categorical values using 1950 averages and we assigned
means to 1970 categorical values using 1980 averages.
The analyses in the paper, including first-stage relationships, are limited to men with positive weekly
wages.  Analyses using 1960-80 data are limited to men born 1910-1919 in the 1960 Census, 1920-29 in the 1970
Census, and 1930-39 in the 1980 Census.  Since year of birth variables are not available in the 1950 and 1990
censuses, analyses using those data sets are limited to men aged 40-49.
2. Calculation of average schooling
Average schooling is the mean of GRADCAP by state and census year for all US-born persons aged 16-64.  For
1970, we used only the Form 2 State sample (a 1 % file) and for 1980 we used a 1% random subsample, drawn from
the 5% State (A Sample) using the IPUMS SUBSAMP variable.  The SLWT weighting variable was adjusted to
reflect the fact that this leaves a 1% sample for each year.  The averages use data excluding Alaska and Hawaii
(residence or birthplace).  Average schooling was calculated for individuals with positive weeks worked and
weighted by the product of SLWT and weeks worked.  Categorical weeks worked variables were imputed as
described above.
3.  Match to CSLs and state average schooling
The CSLs in force in each year from 1914-72 were measured using the five variables described in Section 4 of this
appendix.  For each individual in the microdata extract, we calculated the approximate year the person was age 14
using age on census day (not year of birth, which is not available in 1950 and 1990).  The CSLs in force in that year
in the person’s state of birth were then assigned to that person.  State average schooling was matched to individual
state of residence and census year.4. CSL variables
Data on CSLs were collected and organized by Ms. Xuanhui Ng, in consultation with us.
a. Table of sources
Year enroll_age drop_age req_sch work_age work_sch
 
1914 Commissioner Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt
Commissioner
1917 Biennial Biennial Biennial Biennial Biennial
1921 Chart1-1921 Chart1-1921 Chart1-1921 Chart2-1921 Chart2-1921
1924 Chart1-1924 Chart1-1924 Chart1-1924 Chart2-1924 Chart2-1924
1929 M #197 M #197 #197
1935 Deffenbaugh; Deffenbaugh; Deffenbaugh; Deffenbaugh; Deffenbaugh;
Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt Schmidt
1939 Umbeck Umbeck M M M
1946 SCLS-1946 SCLS-1946 SCLS-1946 SCLS-1946 SCLS-1946
1950 SCLS-1949 SCLS-1949 SCLS-1949 SCLS-1949 SCLS-1949
Keesecker-1950 Keesecker-1950 Keesecker-1950 Keesecker-1950 Keesecker-1950
1954 Keesecker-1955 Keesecker-1955 Keesecker-1955 M Keesecker-1955
1959 SCLS-1960 SLCS-1960 SLCS-1960 SLCS-1960 SLCS-1960
Umbeck Umbeck Umbeck Umbeck
1965 SLCS-1965 SLCS-1965 SLCS-1965 SLCS-1965 SLCS-1965
Steinhilber Steinhilber Steinhilber LLS Steinhilber
Notes:  enroll_age is maximum age by which a child has to enroll at school.
drop_age is minimum age a child is allowed to drop out of school.
req_sch is minimum years of schooling a child has to obtain before dropping out.
work_age is the minimum age at which a child can get work permit.
work_sch is the minimum years of schooling a child needs for obtaining a work permit.
Source abbreviations are given with the references.
b. Methods
Data were drawn from the sources listed in the table of sources.  In some cases sources were ambiguous or there
were conflicts between sources for the same year.  For resolution, we looked for patterns across years that seemed to
make sense, and tried to minimize the number of source changes.  In the source table, “M” denotes missing, i.e., we
found no source or reliable information for this variable in this year.  Missing data were imputed by bringing older
data forward.  Inter-source years were imputed and the data set expanded by bringing older data forward to make a
complete set of 5 CSL laws for each year from 1914 to 1965.  
The imputed data set contains either numerical entries or an “NR” indicating we found laws that appeared
to impose no restriction (e.g., 6 years schooling required for a work permit,  so work_sch=6, but a work permit
available at any age, so work_age=NR).  The algorithm for calculating required years of schooling for dropout and
the required years of schooling for a work permit handles NR codes as follows:
If req_sch=NR, then req_sch=0;
If enroll_age=NR or drop_age=NR, then ca=max(0, req_sch);
If enroll_age£NR and drop_age£NR then ca=max(drop_age-enroll_age, req_sch).
If work_age=NR, then work_age=0;
If work_sch=NR, then work_sch=0;
If enroll_age=NR then cl=max(0, work_sch);
If enroll_age£NR then cl=max(work_age-enroll_age, work_sch).We coded a general literacy requirement without a specific grade or age requirement as NR.  We coded a grade
requirement of “elementary school” as 6, even though this was distinct from sixth grade in some sources (our
dummies would group these requirements anyway).
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Descriptive Statistics for Census IPUMS
QOB Samples





































































Percent Child Labor 6 0.45 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.03
Percent Child Labor 7 0.45 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.16
Percent Child Labor 8 0.10 0.36 0.50 0.41 0.37
Percent Child Labor 9+ 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.31 0.44
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 8
0.57 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.11
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 9
0.40 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.44
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 10
0.02 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 11+
0.01 0.07 0.24 0.37 0.39
N 16659 72344 161029 376479 103184
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Bracketed entries in the ‘Lowest State Average Education’ and ‘Highest
State Average Education’ rows are abbreviations indicating the state with the lowest and highest average schooling. All
other entries are means. The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1960 through 1980, with the sample restricted to
white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. Table 2
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N 609852 626511 729695 16659 72344 161029 376479 103184
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses. The data are from the Census
IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. All regressions
contain Census year, year of birth, and state of birth main effects.Table 3
Description of Child Labor and Compulsory Schooling Laws














































































































































Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All other entries are means. The data are from the Census IPUMS for
1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white men aged 40-49 in the Census year.  See the data appendix for
sources and method.Table 4a
The Effect of Compulsory Attendance Laws and Child Labor Laws on Individual Schooling



















































































































N 609852 626511 729695 376479 609852 626511 729695 376479
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses. The data are from the Census
IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. All regressions
contain Census year, year of birth, and state of birth main effects.Table 4b
Effects of Child Labor and Compulsory Schooling Laws on Discrete Levels of Schooling






































































































































































Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses. All entries are OLS estimates from a regression of a dummy for having completed
the indicated year of schooling on child labor law or compulsory attendance law dummies. All regressions also contain Census year, year of birth, state of birth, and
state of residence main effects. The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1980, with the sample restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year.
The sample size for the 1960-1980 columns is 609,852; the sample size for the 1950-1980 columns is 626,511.Table 5
2SLS Estimates of Private Returns to Schooling
CSL Instruments




























































N 609852 376479 233373 609852 626511 729695 609852 626511 729695
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are in parentheses. All entries are two-stage least squares estimates of private returns to schooling,
using the excluded instruments indicated above and discussed in the text. The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample
restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. ‘QOB’ refers to the set 30 dummies interacting quarter of birth and year of birth. . ‘CL’ refers to a set of
dummies indicating state and year specific child labor laws. ‘CA’ refers to a set of dummies indicating state and year specific compulsory attendance laws. All
models contain Census year, year of birth, and state of birth main effects.Table 6
2SLS Estimates of Private and Social Returns to Schooling
Individual Schooling Endogenous Individual Schooling Exogenous





































































































Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are reported in parentheses. All entries are two-stage least squares estimates of returns to schooling,
using the excluded instruments indicated above and discussed in the text. ‘QOB’ refers to a set of dummies interacting quarter of birth and year of birth.
‘CL’ refers to a set of dummies indicating state and year specific child labor laws. ‘CA’ refers to a set of dummies indicating state and year specific
compulsory attendance laws. The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1960 through 1980, with the sample restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the
Census year. All regressions contain Census year, year of birth, state of birth, and state of residence main effects. The sample size for all columns is 609852.Table 7
2SLS Estimates of Social Returns to Schooling: Additional Results



































































































































































N 609852 448823 537508 609852 969877 609852 609852
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are reported in parentheses. All entries are estimates of returns to
schooling, using dummies for child labor laws or compulsory attendance laws as excluded instruments. The data are from the
Census IPUMS. Unless otherwise indicated, the sample is restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. All
regressions contain individual education, Census year, year of birth, state of birth, and state of residence main effects.Table 8
2SLS Estimates of Private and Social Returns to Schooling: Additional Samples, Individual Education Treated As Exogenous
Baseline Results Separate Private Returns by
Census





































































































































N 626510 729695 626510 729695 626510 729695
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are reported in parentheses. Estimates of social returns to
schooling use dummies for child labor and compulsory attendance laws as excluded instruments. Individual schooling is
treated as exogenous. The sample is restricted to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year. All regressions contain
individual schooling, Census year, year of birth, state of birth, and state of residence main effects.Table 9















































Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are in parentheses. In Panel A, the interaction term is parameterized as
(Individual Education-11)*(State-Year Average Education-11), and in Panel B, it is parameterized as High School Graduate
Dummy*(State-Year Average Education-11), so the estimates of individual and average schooling main effects are evaluated at
11 years of individual and average schooling. Excluded instruments in Panel A are individual schooling interacted with CL and
CA dummies. Excluded instruments in Panel B are a high school graduate dummy interacted with CL and CA dummies. All
regressions contain Census year, year of birth, state of birth, and state of residence main effects.